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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a proof of a condition for uniqueness of
Cournot equilibrium. Existing proofs of the same condition have
shown it to imply a unique element within a limited class of
Cournot equilibria, but leave open the possibility of other pure-
strategy equilibria outside this class. A simpler approach
permits us to derive the condition and to rule out the possibi-
lity of these other equilibria. The approach used also provides
new insight into the conditions for existence of Cournot equili-
brium.
Consider an industry composed of N firms producing a
homogeneous good. Firm i produces the good in quantity qi 2 0.
Its cost function is Ci(qi), defined for all qi 2 0. The inverse
demand function for the good is p(Q), where Q=2qi is the total
industry output.
Assume that:
A.1 There exists a E E (0, co) such that p(Q) > 0 for Q E [0, E)
and p(Q) = 0 for Q _ >.
A.2 p(Q) is twice continuously differentiable and p' (Q) 0 for
Q c [0, ().
A.3 Ci(qi) is twice continuously differentiable and, for any
qi > 0, Ci(qi) > Ci(0), i = 1,...,N.
A.4 For all Q E [0, E) and i = 1,...,N, there exists some a < 0
(possibly dependent on Q and i) such that
p'(Q) - C (qi) i a < 0.
For any cost function satisfying A.3 and A.4, define the
extended function, Fi(xi), as follows:
SCI(x 1 ) if xi 0
Ci(0) + C'(0)x1 + IC'i(0)x if Xi < 0
Note that ri (xi) is twice continuously differentiable for any
xi E (-no, co). Moreover, since F (xi) = C (0) for xi < 0 and A.4
holds for qi 1 0, then for all Q E [0, (.) and xi c (-o, *),
i = 1,...,N, there exists some a < 0 (possibly dependent on Q
and i) such that p'(Q) - Ty'(x 1 ) a. Thus the appropriately
modified A.3 and A.4 must hold for the extended function.
Define gi(xi,Z) = p(Z) + xip'(Z) - Fi(xi). Then Cournot
equilibria must satisfy:
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gi(gi,Z) & 0, qi 0, gi(gi,Z)qi = 0, i = 1,...,N (1)
and
Z = Q (2)
It is straightforward to verify that there exists at least one
solution to (1) and (2). Consider first condition (1). By A.1
through A.3, the function gi(xi,Z) has continuous partial
derivatives for all Z E [0, t) and xi c (-oo, w). By A.4, its
partial derivative with respect to xi is negative, bounded away
from zero. There must therefore exist a unique xi(Z) such that
gi(xi(Z), Z) = 0. This implicit solution being unique, it must be
continuous at all Z E [0, t). For suppose it is discontinuous at
some Z° E [0, E). Then, in the neighborhood of Z°, there exists
no continuous solution to gi(xi, Z) = 0 since xi(Z°0 ) is unique.
But this violates the implicit function theorem at that point. It
follows that condition (1) has a unique solution for all
Z E [0, t), given by qi(Z) = MAX[0, xi(Z)].
Now since qi(Z) is a continuous function of Z, so is
Q(Z) = fqi(Z). We also know that Q(0) 0, since gi(0) 0 for
i=1q ( _ gi
all i = 1,...,N. Furthermore, Q(Z) = 0 for sufficiently large Z
since, by A.1, p(Z) = 0 for Z _ and hence, by A.3, qi(Z) = 0.
There must therefore exist a ZE which solves Q(ZE) = ZE and the
corresponding q(ZE), i = 1,...,N, constitutes a solution to (1)
and (2).
We now provide a condition for the solution of (1) and (2)
to be unique:
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Theorem: Assume that A.1 through A.4 hold. Then, if (only if) at
all q4, i = 1,...,N, we have:
p' (QE) + q p (QE(
ieM(QE ) Ci(9 ) - p' (QE)
where M(Q') = {ijgi(QE) > 0, there exists exactly one solution to
(1) and (2).
Proof: Let qi(Z)~ and qi(Z)* denote the left-hand and right-hand
derivatives of qi(Z). The initial step of the proof is to
establish that:
(i) qi(Z)* 2 qi(Z)~
0 if qi(Z) = 0
(ii) qg (Z) =
Lxi(Z) if qi(Z) > 0
Since xi(Z) is unique for all Z E [0, t) and given A.4, we can
again invoke the implicit function theorem to show that xi(Z) has
a continuous derivative for Z e [0, E) and it is given by:
p'(Z) + xi(Z)p"(Z)
x'(Z) =
Ci (xi(Z)) - p'(Z)
If xi(Z) > 0 then qi(Z) = xi(Z) > 0 and q'(Z)* = qi(Z)~ = x' 1(Z).
Thus (i) and (ii) both hold. If instead xi(Z') < 0 for some
Z' e [0, E) then qi(Z) = 0 at Z' and in a neighborhood of Z',
since xi(Z) is continuous at Z' and hence x 1 (Z) < 0 in some
neighborhood of Z'. Therefore q (Z' )* = qi (Z')~ = 0 and
(i) and (ii) hold. Finally, if xj (Z' ) = 0 for some Z' E [0, ()
then qj (Z' ) = xt (V') = 0. By continuity and nonnegativity of
q 1 (Z), q'(Z')~ . 0 and qi(Z' )* 0. But A.2 and A.4 imply
x'(Z) . 0 when xt(Z) = 0; gi(Z' )* > 0 is therefore impossible.
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Hence qi(Z' )~ q(Z' )* = 0 and again (i) and (ii) hold.
Now let Q' (Z)* denote the right-hand derivative of Q(Z).
Then Q'(Z) = q'(Z)*= g (Z)4= Z x (Z). The first
=1 iEM(Z) EIEM(E)
inequality follows from the definition of Q(Z), while the second
and third follow from (ii). Moreover, (i) implies that
Q' (Z)~ Q' (Z)4 , and an upper bound on Q' (Z)4 also bounds Q' (Z)~.
It follows that if (only if) we have Q'(ZE)* < 1 ( 1), there must
be only one ZE (= QE) and hence only one q?(Z!), i = 1,...,N.
But:
Q'(ZE)+ = Z xi(ZE) p'(E) + g (ZE)pf(ZE)
iEM(ZE) iEM(ZE) Ci(q 1 (ZE)) - pl (ZE)
and the condition stated in the theorem follows directly. 1 .
Since any Cournot equilibrium must satisfy (1) and (2),
A.1 through A.4 and (3) therefore insure that there exists at most
one Cournot equilibrium. In addition, they identify the solution
to (1) and (2) as the only candidate for the Cournot equilibrium. 2
Uniqueness follows if, for independent reasons, a Cournot
equilibrium is known to exist. This could be insured, for
example, by further assuming that the profit function,
p(qi +Y)qi - Ci(qi), is pseudoconcave in qi for i = 1,...,N and
any Y E [0, (-qf). Conditions (1) and (2) then become both
necessary and sufficient for Cournot equilibrium.
Notice that if we require, in addition to A.1 through
A.4, that a firm's marginal revenue be a non-increasing function
of the output of its rivals, so that:
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A.5 p'(Q) + qip"(Q) < 0 for all Q E [0, E), qi . Q, i = 1,...,N
then condition (3) holds with strict inequality. Assumptions A.4
and A.5 combined also insure that each firm's profit function is
strictly concave in its own output. Thus A.1 through A.5 insure
existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium.
Assumption A.5 is frequently involved in discussions of
existence of Cournot equilibrium (see in particular Novshek, 1985
and Shapiro, 1988). Given that p' (Q) <_ 0 by A.2, it in fact is
equivalent to the Novshek assumption that p' (Q) + Qp"(Q) <_ 0 for
Q E [0, t). However, this assumption is unnecessarily strong for
existence of equilibrium, given A.1 through A.4. For, any
solution to (1) and (2) is a Cournot equilibrium if and only if
qj yields a global maximum of p(qi+ QEi)qi - Ci(qi), where
QEi = QE - qi and i = 1,...,N. As long as this condition holds at
some solution to (1) and (2), existence of a Cournot equilibrium
is assured. It is unnecessary for existence of Cournot equili-
brium to assume that this condition holds at every solution to (1)
and (2). Moreover, at the designated solution to (1) and (2), it
is unnecessary that qi be globally optimal in response to every
aggregate output of the firms, but merely to QEi. Finally, it is
unnecessary that each firm's profit function be pseudoconcave,
much less everywhiere strictly concave.
The uniqueness condition (3) is the same as that derived
by Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) (equation (16), Corollary 3.1,
p. 687) and by Kolstad (1988) (equation (5), Theorem 2, p. 4).
The approach taken here is however much simpler and the proof much
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shorter than theirs. Moreover, their papers do not in fact
establish conditions for uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. They
only establish conditions for the uniqueness of one class of
Cournot equilibria, which they label "nondegenerate". In neither
of those papers can the authors rule out the existence of one or
more other Cournot equilibria where some of the N firms are just
at the margin of becoming active or not, i.e., equilibria where
qi = 0 and gi(qi,Q) = 0 for some or all i*M(Q) (see Definition 2,
p. 683 in Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1987, and pp. 2-3 in Kolistad,
1988). Hence, our results fill an important gap.
Our approach is closest to that of Szidarovszky and
Yakowitz (1977). They use it to show the existence of a unique
Cournot equilibrium when marginal cost is increasing and inverse
demand is downward sloping and concave. Their assumptions imply
A.1 through A.5, but are, of course, unnecessarily strong.
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NOTES
1. Given A.1 through A.4 and (3), we will necessarily have
Z E E[0, El and Q(Z) - Z = 0 for all Z = ZE, and the method
of interval bisection (see for example Conrad and Clark, 1987,
p. 40) would in such a case rapidly converge to the unique
solution to (1) and (2).
2. Not every solution to (1) and (2) need be a Cournot equili-
brium. Although (1) and (2) insure that each firm selects a
point in reply to the outputs of the other firms which
satisfies the necessary conditions for a local maximum of its
profit function, this need not be a local best reply, much
less a global best reply, for every firm.
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